Introduction
Expert systems were originally defined as a method of encoding the knowledge and rea soning of a human expert into a computer pro gram. However, for many diagnostic and an alytical reasoning problems we would prefer that the computer program base its reasoning on objective facts rather than human exper tise, especially when no experts are available or the reasoning of the available experts is sus pect. Thus, we propose a system for reasoning from objective criteria.. When objective data is collected by scien tists and engineers it is often in the form of in dependently distributed trials or experiments. An example of experimental data is: in a sam ple of 100 toys 10 arrived damaged. Some of these experiments verify facts, as in our ex ample, others may verify rules, i.e. of 10 red toys 1 arrived damaged, establishing a rela tionship between redness and damage. Sev eral rules can conflict, i.e. of 10 toy trucks 9 arrived damaged which raises the question of the red toy truck. This paper describes a com putationally feasible algorithm for making de cisions from this type of evidence. We present a preliminary methodology for evidence com bination, where the source of the evidence is experimental in nature.
Our scheme can also account for other meth ods of expressing objective information such as axiomatic statements, ie. trucks have wheels, and restrictions on the probabilities of events, ie. the probability of heads on a fair coin is 0.5, the probability of heads when Joe is flipping the coin is somewhere between 0.6 and 0.8. Initially we will focus on our management of experimental evidence since this is the unique feature of our approach. [Nil86] where he introduces the JDVs (with a different name). His work analyzes the case where all the information are point prob abilities for events; our work reduces to his when our information is in this form. Our work was inspired largely by Henry Ky burg and Ron Loui's work [Kyb87, Lou84] at the University of Rochester on the logi-3 cal foundations of statistical inference. Their
Definitions
The input to our system consists of a set of propositions, and a set of experiments that test logical combinations of these propositions. For example, consider playing poker against Harry. What can we deduce from Harry's body language about his hand? Consider these two propositions:
work uses experimental results to derive sets of confidence intervals and then develops an algebra of these sets of confidence intervals.
Other important influences on this work is the Dempster-Shafer system [WH82, WS88] for managing uncertainty and the analyses thereof [Gro85, HL85, Kyb87] . Dempster Shafer reasoning expresses belief as mass func tions over sets of possible beliefs and develops a calculus of such mass functions for evidence combination. While such mass functions may be a good way of summarizing human exper tise, we felt that they were not suitable for expressing the uncertainty inherent in objec tive evidence. Hau and Kashyap [HK87] sug gested a method of applying Dempster-Shafer and fuzzy reasoning to rule based expert sys tems which we consider one of the best ap proaches to this problem if the rules and facts in the system are derived from a subjective or qualitative source.
This work owes a great deal to the Bayesian interval approach to uncertainty; it reduces 1. A: Harry lit his pipe.
B: Harry has 2 pair.
Some experiments about the relationship be tween these two events are: (1) In the first 30 hands Harry lit his pipe in 9 of them. (2) In the next 40 hands Harry had two pair in 5 of them. (3) In the following hands you noticed that of the 6 times he lit his pipe 5 of those times he had two pair.
The joint distribution of events in our do main contain all the information about the domain that is useful for deduction. The joint distribution is the probability distribu tion over the elements of the truth table, i.e. in our poker example: If we knew the probability of a, b, c, and d, we could determine the probability of any logi cal combination of events and all the condi tional probabilities too. Hence, to engage in deduction from experimental evidence, we will study the issue of estimating a joint distribu tion from experimental evidence.
Maximum Estimation Likelihood
In this work we propose estimating the proba bility of a proposition as being one of the prob abilities derived from a joint distribution that maximizes the probability of the experimental results.
In estimation theory if we are estimating the value of e, the function that maps values of e into probabilities of the observed data is called the likelihood function. The value of e that maximizes the likelihood function is called the maximum likelihood estimate. The maximum likelihood joint distribution is the joint distri bution that maximizes the probability of the experimental results.
We assume that each experiment is identi cally independently distributed (iid) and that implies that the probability of a set of experi ments is the product of the probabilities from each experiment. Hence, the likelihood func tion for statements (1) and (2) of our poker example is:
Conditional experiments, where the result is only reported when a condition applies ie: statement (3), have a conditional probability. The probability of a conditional experiment is the ratio of the probability of the conjunction of the condition and the event and the prob ability of the condition. Thus the probability of statement (3) is The probability of (1), (2) and (3) is Since we had an experiment on A where A occurred 9 times, we could perform up to 9 conditional experiments on A and still express the likelihood function as a polynomial (rather than a rational function). This paper's anal ysis is restricted to sets of experiments whose likelihood function is a polynomial; this means that given N experiments using condition X, an experiment was done where condition X oc curred at least N times.
Observation Space the sampling was unbiased. The probability of 5 observing a logical combination of the primi tives (such as "A or B") is a sum of proba bilities in the joint distribution; in our poker example the probability of A is a + b and B is Each joint distribution is an assignment of probabilities to a finite set of mutually exclu sive events; hence a joint distribution can be considered a vector (JDV) and the locus of joint distributions is a set of points in a vec tor space. In our poker example there are four a + c. Thus the probability of an experiment on A where A was observed 3 out of 5 times is then (a+ b)3(c + d)2• The iid assumption mutually exclusive events, a, b, c and d; assign ments of probabilities to these events corre spond to four dimensional vectors. The prob ability of an observation is a linear function of the JDV, in our poker example A has a prob ability of a + b. These linear fu nctions define a dual space of observation vectors (OV) with the same dimensionality, whose coefficients are 1 if the corresponding element of the joint dis tribution is compatible with the observation and 0 otherwise. In our poker example A is represented by the vector (1, 1, 0, 0) and B is (1, 0, 1, 0) and A but not B is the vector (0, 1, 0, 0). The probability of an observation under a joint distribution is the dot product of the OV with the JDV. by the JDV's is the cross product of the obser vation space and the space spanned by vectors perpendicular to the observation space. We call the space spanned by vectors perpendicu lar to the observation space the null space.
Note that if the difference of two JDV's is an element of the null space, for a set of exper iments, then the probability of each observa tion made in the experiments is the same for both JDV's. Since the probability of all the observations is the product of the probabili ties of each observation, the probability of the results fr om the set of experiments is the same for both JDV's.
Hence, the results from those experiments can not tell us which of the corresponding joint distributions is a better model. For example, consider the evidence fr om state ments (1) and (2) of the poker example; the observations correspond to these four veeFirst, we show that the likelihood function, L, is concave. Assume that i t and h are two JDV's; let f('Y) = logL(il+'Y(h-it)); L(:r) = ni Bi(z) where Sj are SUIDS of elements of the joint distribution. Each si is the dot product of an observation vector and a JDV; hence
Since the second derivative of f is the arith metic inverse of a sum of squares, it is never positive; hence f is concave. Since j 1 and h are arbitrary JDV's L must be concave. Now assume that it and h are maximizers of L. Since the log likelihood function is con cave, all it+ l(h-it) with 0 < 1 < 1 also maximize the joint likelihood function. Hence, the second derivative off is 0 for 0 < 1 < 1 because /(I) = log L(it + l(h-it)) is a con stant function.
Clearly V i oi • (12 -jt) = 0; hence h -it is in the null space of our observations since it is perpendicular to all of our observation vectors. If it is a maximum likelihood JDV then h is a maximum likelihood JDV if and only if it-h is in the null space. 513 with, ie. proposition A in our poker exam ple, its probability is the same in all likelihood maximizing distributions. If no experiments have been done on a proposition, such as not A and not B in the poker example, upper and lower bounds for its probability in likelihood maximizing joint distributions can be deter mined by the method of feasible directions.
We believe that the average computational cost of our system is proportional to the num ber of propositions whose probabilities are bounded and on which experiments have been performed; hence entering and retrieving in formation is linear in the amount of information entered.
Propositional Axioms
An important feature of our system is -8 introducing a new observable 0 with experi ments in which 0 was true p of the time causes Statements of propositional logic, like A-B can be added to this system. They just fix the probability of certain elements of the joint distribution at 0. If we added B-A to our poker example then the probability of c would be known to be 0 and the likelihood function would be: a10b(a + b)3d2t(b + d)35. If experi mental evidence directly contradicts an axiom, either the evidence or the axiom must be disour system to assign a probability of p to 0; this is in accordance with intuition. This fea ture derives from the fact that the {3(n, m) dis tribution is maximized at ::.ti .
Computational Methods
To discover a vector of positive numbers whose components sum to 1 which maximizes the likelihood function is a problem in nonlinear programming. Constraining the vector to be a probability distribution limits the search space to a convex bounded set (in the form of a hy pertetrahedron). Thus we suggest applying the method of feasible directions ofTopkis and Veinott [BS79]; this algorithm provably con verges to a maximum of the polynomials we propose here.
carded. In our system, the probability of a proposi tion can be limited to a specified range. This is a linear constraint on the values of the JDV's. Since the space of legitimate JDV's is the in tersection of linear constraints the method of feasible directions still applies. Thus we can insert into our system experimental evidence, axiomatic knowledge, and probability inter vals.
Simple Example
Given a maximum likelihood joint distribu-9 tion, the method of feasible directions can also discover the bounds for any proposition. If In our poker example (0.0375, 0.2625, 0.0875, 0.6125) is a JDV for statements (1) and a proposition has been directly experimented (2); we have discovered using numerical tech niques that the maximum likelihood JDV for statements (1), (2), and (3) is approx imately (0.174,0.066,0,0.76). Since the null space for (1 ),(2) and (3) is itself null this is the only maximum likelihood JDV. From these JDV's we can compute maximum and mini mum probabilities for these events· Event -Any level of correlation between A and B is possible.
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-If Harry isn't lighting his pipe then bet your fortune he doesn't have two pair (this is one of the difficulties with this approach).
Our poker example demonstrates how our sys tem balances general knowledge about the fre quency of an event with inferential knowledge about an event.
To further examine this case consider what happens if we observe another 200 hands in which Harry never has two pair (4). The JDV for this case is (0.0396257, 0.130458, 0, 0.829916). We can update our table to include this assertion ru below:
Event
(1) and (2) Statement ( 4) has reduced the probability of B considerably even in the case where A is true. Harry's lighting his pipe is still a very good clue that he may have two pairs.
-B being false substantially constrains A. 10
Inadequacies and Im provements -Harry's lighting his pipe tells you very little about his hand.
• In the case where observations (1) and (2) and (3) have been made:
-Since A and B are connected by statement {3) their probabilities are brought closer together.
-B--+A.
-If Harry is lighting his pipe definitely bet on his having two pair.
There are three major difficulties with this sys tem:
1. It sometimes behaves in an unintuitive fashion;
2. When convenient, it assigns the probabil ity of 0 to events; The initial problem will occur in any nor mative system since there are cases where the correct decision is an unintuitive one. Such probability paradox's abound and can be very subtle. Thus human judgment of intuitive sys tems is not useful for evaluating normative probability systems. A better judgment of its effectiveness is to evaluate the effectiveness of expert systems built using this system.
The application of the maximum likelihood principle leads to the second problem. Assum ing certain events are impossible often maxi mizes the likelihood of a set of observations (if the impossible event is not observed). This leads to the system making overly strong state ments such as saying that patients without symptoms do not have colds under observa tions [3).
The maximum likelihood principle also yields the last problem. If one wants to add into our system new information, then using Bayesian updating will not generate the prob abilities that adding the information directly into the system and updating its constraints or polynomial would.
The last two problems can be eliminated by discarding the maximum likelihood princi ple, instead, using the likelihood function and Bayes' law to translate a prior probability dis tribution over JDV's into a posterior distribu tion of JDV's. Then the probability of any event or combination of events is computed by integrating over the posterior distribution of JDV's. This integration can be speeded by the fact that most probable JDV's in this dis tribution will lie near a maximum likelihood JDV's.
We are investigating deriving the distribu tion over joint marginal distributions with Oc cam's razor: the probability of a JDV would be a function of its simplicity. Solomonoff has developed methods for evaluating the simplic ity of distributions and assigning probabilities based on this evaluation [Sol89) . 515 
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Conclusion
We have proposed a computationally efficient method for propositional evidence combina tion given logical axioms, point probabili ties, probability intervals and experimental ev idence. Our system returns probability inter vals that are often point probabilities; it fol lows a strictly Bayesian interpretation of the evidence subject to the maximum likelihood principle. In domains where the evidence is largely objective such as medical diagnosis or computer vision such a system may be supe rior to those based on Dempster-Shafer rea soning or probability networks.
